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Abstract In order to observe a patent application at the
firm level, two conditions need to be met: new products
need to be of patentable quality, which depends both on
the degree of novelty of innovations and on the total
number (portfolio) of innovations; and the benefits of
patents need to be higher than the costs of owning them.
Analyzing the patent propensity of small and large UK
firms using a novel innovation-level survey (the SIPU
survey) linked to Community Innovation Survey data,
we find that when we consider the whole innovation
portfolio, smaller firms do patent less than larger firms.
However, using data on individual innovations, we find
that smaller firms are no less likely to patent any specific
innovation than larger firms. We argue that size differ-
ences in the probability to patent relate primarily to the
“portfolio effect,” i.e., larger firms generate more inno-
vations than smaller firms, and therefore are more likely
to create one or more which are patentable. As for the
decision to patent a patentable innovation, we find that
cost barriers, more than issues of innovation quality or
enforceability, deter small firms from patenting specific
innovations. Measures to address the costs of patenting
for smaller—perhaps by considering patents as eligible
costs for R&D tax credits—and/or subsidizing SMEs’
participation in IP litigation schemes may both encour-
age patent use by smaller firms.
Keywords Patenting . SME . Small firms . UK
JEL classifications O32 . O34 . O38 . L26
1 Introduction
Innovation—the market introduction of new products,
services or processes—can add value for producers and
consumers and drive economic growth (Baumol, 2002).
Innovating firms may gain a first mover advantage, earn
higher returns, and establish a position of market lead-
ership (Ulhoi, 2012). Among innovators, small firms
have an almost mythical role as the source of new and
radical ideas and the motors of creative destruction
(Schumpeter, 1912). However, it is widely recognized
that firms of all sizes find it difficult to appropriate the
returns to innovation leading to under-investment in
R&D and innovation. One element of the policy re-
sponse to this problem has been the development of
legal forms of intellectual property (IP) protection such
as patents and trademarks. In each case, the main objec-
tive is to limit imitation and help innovating firms ap-
propriate the returns to their investment.
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An enduring debate in discussions of IP policy, how-
ever, has been the questionable value of patenting for
small firms (Fernandez-Ribas, 2010; Veer & Jell, 2012;
Marzi, Dabic, Daim, & Garces, 2017). There are several
separate strands of argument that contribute to this be-
lief. The work of Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000)
suggested that small firms are a distinct group and prefer
to protect their intellectual property using non-patent
methods. Why should this be the case? Two types of
explanations dominate the literature. The first argues
that small firms may simply be less familiar with formal
IP mechanisms. As Hall, Helmers, Rogers, and Sena
(2013) note in their analysis of UK firms “Because firms
that use one IP mechanism are more likely to use anoth-
er, another possibility is that firms have a “propensity”
to use or not use IP, and that the problem is lack of
familiarity with the system and sub-optimal behavior on
the part of some firms”. The second explanation in the
research literature and public policy documents is that
due to resource constraints and/or registration and de-
fense costs, patenting is of little value, as an intellectual
property (IP) protection mechanism for small firms
(Hughes & Mina, 2010; Athreye & Fassio, 2018).
Ensuring that IP policy “works” for both larger and
smaller firms is important to maximize the social value
of innovation. Here, we revisit the reasons for small
firms’ low patenting rates and make three contributions
to our understanding. First, we develop a conceptual
framework which looks more carefully at why small
firm may or may not use patents. In particular, we
distinguish between the probability of having a patent-
able innovation and the decision to apply for it based on
a cost-benefit analysis. Further, we distinguish between
two factors that may cause a firm to have smaller or
larger numbers of patentable innovations, viz. firms’
propensity to patent any specific innovation and the
breadth of firms’ portfolio of patentable innovations.
Second, we show that there are no theoretical argu-
ments which unequivocally suggest that small firms
should have a lower propensity to patent any specific
innovation, although resource constraints suggest that
smaller firms are likely to have a smaller portfolio of
patentable innovations. Further, we argue that having a
portfolio which includes patentable innovations is only
a necessary condition for whether or not a firm will
actually make a patent application. This decision also
depends on the perceived benefit-cost ratio of patenting
being positive—the sufficient condition for patenting by
small firms.
Third, we test our hypotheses using a novel database
that combines innovation-level information that can be
linked to the UK Community Innovation Survey 2015.
By linking the two databases, we obtain information on
the extent to which firms use patents and, where appli-
cable, their reasons for not patenting. These data help us
to see that most existing analyses of patenting by small
firms confound the portfolio and propensity to patent
effects. Looking more closely at the reasons for not
patenting, we conclude that small firms are deterred by
the costs of patenting rather than any other concerns,
including lack of awareness.
Our results have important implications for patent
policy, especially in the UK, from where our data
are drawn. IPO (2017) notes that the UK was the
sixth largest national jurisdiction in terms of number
of patent applications filed, in a world ranking led
by China and the USA, in 2014. Adjusting these
figures for GDP and population puts the UK fourth
and second in the world respectively. However, the
vast majority of UK patent applications are filed by
foreign applicants. In 2012, only 7% of patent ap-
plications covering the UK (including patents valid
in the EPO) were filed by domestic applicants, com-
pared to 34% in Germany, 48% in the USA, and
76% in South Korea.1 The reason for this is believed
to be the increasing dominance of service industries
even in hitherto manufacturing sectors, and the dom-
inance of Knowledge Intensive Business Services
(less protected by patents) in innovative activities.
In an overall climate of low patenting, where
even large UK firms accounted for only small shares
of patenting, the statistics on patenting from SME
firms in the UK is even more worrying. IPO (2017:
p.37) notes that based on different definitions of size
(assets, turnover, and employment) between 0.6 and
1.5% of SMEs and less than 1% of micro enterprises
had patents published in 2014. This compared to
about 4% of large firms that patented in 2014. As
patenting has been shown to have large follow-on
effects for innovation in small firms (Galasso &
1 Using an alternative measure more tied to innovation activity viz.
measuring patents per million Euros of R&D solely within the
manufacturing sector does control to some extent for differences in
sector and levels of R&D investment. Even by this measure, UK
companies still have lower patents, with 0.5 patents per million Euros
of R&D compared to one patent per million Euros of R&D in Germa-
ny, France, the USA, and China, 3.7 in Japan and 6.1 in Korea. As this
is a sample of large R&D investing companies, and differences in the
UK economy as a whole could be even larger. (IPO 2017: p.50)
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Schankerman, 2015), finding ways to reduce the
barriers for small firms may have a large impact on
the growth of innovative small firms.
IP offices have hitherto operated outreach programs
to raise awareness of IP instruments among smaller
firms based on the implicit belief that small firms have
a lower propensity to patent their innovations.2 The
arguments in this paper about the salience of cost bar-
riers suggest that IP policy may also need to develop
measures which can reduce patenting costs for small
firms. These could take several forms but the most
important is likely to be helping with the legal costs of
patent enforcement.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we outline our conceptual framework
which differentiates between firms’ ability to develop
patentable innovations, a necessary condition for
patenting, and the cost-benefit of actually patenting,
the sufficient condition. Section 3 profiles our data and
empirical approach and Section 4 describes the main
results. Section 5 summarizes the key points and draws
out the implications.
2 Conceptual framework
Previous studies have suggested that the conditions
for patenting may work differently in larger and
smaller firms. In terms of the ability to generate
patentable innovations, the flexibility and respon-
siveness of small firms may offset their limited
resource compared to larger firms (Vossen, 1998).
However, we might generally anticipate that larger
firms have more significant portfolios of innova-
tions. In terms of the benefit-cost ratio which may
influence the propensity to patent any specific
innovation, this is generally argued to favor larger
companies (Hughes & Mina, 2010). Patents may
be expensive to implement, disproportionately so
perhaps for small firms, and may be overly costly
for small firms to defend effectively (Perez-Cano
& Villen-Altamirano, 2013). We discuss each in
turn.
2.1 Developing patentable innovations
Firms’ decisions about whether to invest in innovation,
and which innovation projects to undertake, will reflect
cognitive, behavioral, and organizational resource fac-
tors. Among the cognitive influences, having a smaller
senior management team within small firms will inevi-
tably limit their cultural and experiential diversity, with
potentially negative impacts on creativity and market
understanding (Galia & Zenou, 2012; Talke, Salomo, &
Rost, 2010). This may reduce small firms’ ability both to
perceive market opportunities and develop innovative
responses. Small firms more limited management teams
may also mean they have weaker search capabilities,
absorptive capacity, and specialist understanding than
that available in larger businesses. This may limit small
firms’ ability to take advantage of external knowledge or
form (or effectively exploit) external innovation partner-
ships (Valentim, Lisboa, & Franco, 2016; Vahter, Love,
& Roper, 2014). Both the limited diversity and cognitive
capabilities of the managerial teams of small firms seem
likely to limit both the extent and degree of novelty of
small firms’ innovation portfolios.3
Behavioral factors linked to firms’ performance ob-
jectives; managerial practices or routines may also be
important in shaping firms’ innovation portfolios.
Where firms have ambitious performance targets, this
may lead to innovation portfolios which are larger and
more radical (Gundry, Kickul, Welsch, & Posig, 2003)
with the potential for first-mover advantage (Kopel &
Loffler, 2008). Firms with more modest performance
goals may instead place more emphasis on incremental
innovation (Kok & Ligthart, 2014). Management prac-
tices may also have an impact on innovation, with
transformational leadership practices more strongly as-
sociated with radical innovation (Rosing, Frese, &
Bausch, 2011). Firms’ engagement with design leader-
ship (Design Council, 2015), advanced management
techniques (Bourke & Roper, 2016), and quality im-
provement (Bourke & Roper, 2017) may also positively
influence innovation outcomes. It is not clear a priori
whether these behavioral effects on the probability of
developing patentable innovations will be more felici-
tous in smaller or larger firms: smaller—and particularly
younger firms—may have more ambitious performance
2 IPO initiatives such as IP Equip, the IP Health Check and the IP
finance toolkit help companies, particularly SMEs, towards a better
understanding of how patenting their innovations can enhance their
business.
3 One exception to this may be where smaller firms are focussed on
super-niche market strategies or specific technologies such as in the
German Mittelstand (Venohr & Mayer, 2007; Simon, 1996).
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goals and more dynamic leadership, while more
established firms may have advantages in terms of en-
gagement with design and leading-edge management
practices.
In organizational terms, small firms’ advantages in
terms of flexibility have been contrasted with resource
limitations which may reduce their ability to develop
innovations of sufficient novelty to be patentable
(Vossen 154998). R&D activity in smaller firms, for
example, may be informal and ad hoc, reducing both
knowledge creation and absorption capacity (Griffith,
Redding, & Van Reenan, 2003). Smaller firms’ knowl-
edge search and boundary spanning capabilities may
also be more limited (Mina, Bascavusoglu-Moreau, &
Hughes, 2014). However, hierarchic and functional
structures within larger firms may inhibit knowledge
flows and diffusion across the organization reducing
levels of innovation (Leonard-Barton, 1992). A priori,
as with the behavioral influences considered earlier,
organizational factors may therefore have an uncertain
effect on the probability that small and larger firms will
successfully generate patentable innovations.
2.2 The benefit-cost ratio of patenting
The costs of establishing a patent are significant and
impact disproportionately on small firms (Kingston,
2001). Beyond the financial implications, there may also
be strategic costs or risks associated with patenting and
disclosure—patents are public documents which pro-
vide detailed information on an invention. “It is often
the case that imitation is still possible without infringing
an incumbent innovator’s rights: the nature of the tech-
nology might make it possible to ‘invent around’ a
particular design or technical specification” (Hughes &
Mina, 2010, p. 9).
The central benefit provided by a patent is temporary
monopoly, but the economic value of this depends on
firms’ ability to appropriate the benefits of that monop-
oly. Both commercial and legal aspects are important in
determining the firms’ ability to appropriate the value of
a patent. Small firms may be in a weaker position than
larger firms to directly appropriate the benefits of pat-
ents, however, Hughes and Mina (2010, p. 9) summa-
rize evidence from Giuri et al. (2007) and Gambardella,
Giuri, and Luzzi (2007) which suggests that across
Europe: “small firms exploit internally 55.8% of their
patents. … Smaller firms also have a relatively high
percentage of patents that are licensed out (15.0%) …
smaller firms report very low figures for unused patents.
Taken together, these results are consistent with smaller
firms licensing out more in pursuit of the complemen-
tary assets necessary to develop and appropriate value.
They are also consistent with an inability or reluctance
to maintain sleeping or dormant patents because of the
relatively high fixed costs which many small firms may
be unwilling or unable to bear. They thus may patent
more viable intellectual property".
Whether firms directly exploit or license patented
technology, they may also need to enforce patents if
infringed. Hughes and Mina (2010, p. 2) suggest that
“even where SMEs are able to recognize the importance
of patenting and to put in place appropriate patents, they
may be at a substantial disadvantage in enforcing their
IP rights. This is particularly likely to be the case with
respect to larger firms who not only may have a suffi-
ciently deep pocket to protect their own IP or challenge
the IP of SMEs, but may have greater competence at
both designing and defending their own patent position
against emergent rival patents". Qualitative interviews
reported in IPO (2017) suggest that small firms also
perceive the high costs of potential litigation as part of
the overall cost of patenting.
Patents may also generate value for a business through
signaling to “partners and external finance, in producing
an increase in the company’s market value, in helping
capture new market share or protect the existing one, and
in serving as an asset base capable of reinforcing the
company’s competitive advantage by way of access to
external technologies.” (Perez-Cano & Villen-
Altamirano 2013, p. 27). Signaling advantages depend
strongly on sector with US studies highlighting a strong
concentration of patents in a few industries, namely phar-
maceutical, biotechnology, medical equipment,
chemicals, computers, and special purpose machinery.
2.3 Hypothesis development4
These management and resource differences between
small and larger firms result in quite different profiles
of innovation activity and patenting behavior. For
example, it is widely accepted in the empirical
literature on patents that large firms have a higher
propensity to patent than small firms. Small firms are
usually expected to prefer other informal IP protection
4 A formalization of our arguments is developed in Annex 1.
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mechanisms, such as secrecy, rather than the more
formal, costly, and bureaucratic patents. Using survey
data for several European countries, Arundel (2001)
finds that the propensity to use secrecy rather than
formal patent protection is higher among small firms
than among large firms. Pajak (2016) also finds that
even among small firms with less than 30 employees
size is negatively associated with patent applications.
Hall et al. (2013) using a sample drawn from the Com-
munity Innovation Survey (CIS), focused on UK firms,
find again that firm size, as proxied by number of
employees, is negatively related to the preference for
protection by patents versus secrecy. Many of the prior
studies that have analyzed the patenting probability of
firms also point to the role of R&D and other resources
that may be associated with firm size in explaining
patenting behavior (Levin et al. 1987; Arundel &
Kabla, 1998; Arora et al. 2008). Thus, the overall re-
source advantage enjoyed by larger firms in conducting
R&D also suggests that they will have a larger portfolio
of innovations which will be patented. The combination
of resource and portfolio effects suggests our first
hypothesis:
2.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Firm-level propensity to patent
Large firms have a higher overall propensity to patent
when compared to small firms
The typical distribution of the value of innovations,
even within a single firm’s portfolio, is usually strongly
asymmetric, with few innovations often accounting for a
very large share of all sales (Scherer & Harhoff, 2000).
This may suggest that firms implement very different
strategies for different innovations, according to their
specific value or perceived value. Moreover, as stressed
by Arora, Athreye, and Huang (2013), the propensity to
patent of small firms may reflect the small number of
patentable innovations created by smaller firms. In other
words, given a similar propensity to patent between firm
A (large firm) and firm B (a small firm), the likelihood
of patenting will be lower for firm B simply because it
introduces fewer patentable innovations, than firm A.
Generally, it is not easy to identify the separate effects
of the propensity to patent and firms’ innovation port-
folio as most survey datasets on innovation measure
outcomes at the firm level rather than for any given
innovation. A sensible empirical strategy needs to get
rid of the effect of the portfolio effect from the number
of inventions, so that patenting behavior can be
observed as a function of patentability alone. Thus, our
second conjecture is as follows:
2.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Innovation-level propensity
to patent
Comparing like for like, for any innovation of value, the
propensity to patent between large and small firms is not
different.
Lastly, and following the discussion in Section 2.2,
patentability is only a necessary condition for patenting.
If an invention is patentable, firms will decide on
patenting based on the perceived costs and benefits
which may include the nature of competition faced by
the firm and the costs of patenting. Put differently, while
patentability gives us the necessary condition for
patenting, the sufficient condition for patenting is a
function of perceived costs and benefits. This suggests
our third hypothesis:
2.3.3 Hypothesis 3: Size differences in the costs
and benefits of patenting
Small firms face greater barriers to innovation on ac-
count of the costs of creating and defending patents than
larger firms.
3 Data and empirical methods
3.1 Data sources
The UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO) commis-
sioned the Survey of Innovation and Patent Use
(SIPU) to identify the main barriers to the use of intel-
lectual property protection in the UK. SIPU 2015 fo-
cussed on understanding the characteristics of firms’
“most valuable innovation.” It asked whether these in-
novations were protected by patents and trademarks
and, if they were not the reasons why firms had not
applied for patent or trademark protection.
SIPU 2015 sampled all firms who had agreed to
respond to questions about their most valuable innova-
tion from the 15,091 firms that were surveyed by UK
Innovation Survey (UKIS) 2015. This provided a total
eligible sample of 886 businesses. Four hundred
seventy-seven (54%) of these businesses had specifical-
ly indicated on the UKIS 2015 that they had engaged in
innovation in product, process, or business strategy in
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the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2014. The
survey was administered by the telephone survey team
from the Office of National Statistics soon after the
conclusion of the UK Innovation Survey 2015. The
SIPU survey achieved a response rate of 72% with
responses from 277 innovators and 291 non-innovators.
We were also able to look up the CIS responses for each
SIPU respondent.
To illustrate the representativeness of the SIPU respon-
dents, we compare it to the UKIS 2015 in three dimen-
sions (Table 1). First, we examine business size. SIPU
over-sampled small firms but under-sampled medium and
large firms in comparison to the UKIS. This is likely to
reduce the proportion of innovating firms in SIPU relative
to the UKIS. Second, SIPU over-sampled innovative
firms overall, but also over-sampled product innovators
vis-à-vis the UKIS (Table 1, part B). Finally, when we
compare the industry composition of SIPU with UKIS
2015, and see a broadly similar industrial composition
(Table 1, part C). The biases in the SIPU sample make
direct comparisons with the aggregates in the UKIS prob-
lematic and we account for this in our empirical analysis.
Innovation itself is recorded differently in the two
surveys. In a 3-year period, a firm may generate several
innovations some of which are more valuable than
others. The UKIS asks firms to record their strategy
over the totality of innovations introduced from 2012
to 2014. SIPU focuses only on firms’ most valuable
innovation. As we noted in Section 2, not being able
to observe how many innovations a firm produces
makes it difficult to disentangle the portfolio and pro-
pensity to patent effects. To address this, we define our
dependent variable in two ways. First, the survey instru-
ment used in SIPU looks at the probability of applying
for a patent for firms’ most commercially valuable in-
novation. The reasoning here is that an innovation
which makes the most money for the company is also
the innovation that it is most likely to be worth
protecting through formal IP. Second, while the number
of innovations of a firm is not observable, many respon-
dents can say with some degree of certainty what per-
centage of their innovations is protected by patents and
other formal IP strategies. This is an effective way of de-
scaling patenting. The survey instrument in UKIS 2015
asks exactly this kind of a question.
Table 2 reports the simple average for the share of
revenues due to innovation reported in UKIS and SIPU.
Table 1 Comparison of SIPU and UKIS 2015 respondents
UKIS SIPU
N = 15,091 N = 634
A. By firm sizeband
Small (10–49 employees) 44 55
Medium (50–249 employees) 36 30
Large (250 plus employees) 20 15
Total 100 100
B. By innovation type
Product or service 14 27
Process 16 8
Product/service and/or process 24 35
C. By sector (SIC 2007)
Primary (SIC 2007 05–09) 0.9 0.5
Manufacturing (SIC 2007 10–33) 16.3 18.3
Utilities (SIC 2007 35–39) 1.5 1.3
Construction (SIC 2007 41–43) 4.9 3.6
Wholesale and retail services (45–47) 31.0 27.8
Other services (49–83) 45.4 48.6
Total 100 100
Sources: Authors’ computations on SIPU 2015merged with UKIS
2015
Table 2 Share of innovative sales in CIS and SIPU, all figures in %
N Contribution of innovation
to turnover in 2014
(UKIS)
N Contribution of the most
valuable innovation to
turnover in 2014
(SIPU)
Contribution of most
valuable innovation to
overall innovative sales in 2014
(SIPU/UKIS)
All firms 269 37.2 246 21.7 58.3
Small firms 142 41.4 133 28 67.6
Medium firms 89 33.1 80 16.7 50.5
Large firms 38 31.2 33 8.4 26.9
Sources: Authors’ computations on SIPU 2015 merged with UKIS 2015
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Although the sets of figures are not directly comparable,
firms’ most valuable innovation accounts for more than
half of all innovative sales on average and especially for
small and medium firms.5 Thus, we expect that these are
innovations which firms will try to protect using formal
intellectual property instruments. In Table 3, we can also
see that firms that reported using patents to protect their
innovations in the UKIS also tended to report using
patent protection to protect their most valuable innova-
tion and vice versa: about 85% of the firms lie on the
leading diagonal. This suggest that firms that use patents
to protect technology and markets for their most valu-
able innovation are also likely to do so more generally.
Understanding the barriers to patenting firms’ most
valuable innovation should therefore provide a good
guide to more general barriers to patenting.
3.2 Empirical approach
Our empirical strategy uses information on different
dimensions of firms’ patenting activity to explore the
impact of the propensity to patent and portfolio effects.
First, to test Hypothesis 1, we estimate a model where
the dependent variable PAT is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if firm i patented any innovation and zero otherwise:
PATi ¼ α0 þ α1SIZE1 þ α2xi þ εi ð1Þ
where SIZE is a set of dummy variables relating to
the size of company i, and x is a set of other firm-level
controls such as whether a firm was product innovator
and process innovator, undertook R&D activity, and
introduced new to market innovations. ε is an idiosyn-
cratic error term.6 The coefficient α1 will reflect the
combined propensity to patent and portfolio effect. We
also include a set of industry dummy variables in each
model (see Annex 3). The equation is estimated at the
firm level using UKIS data and samples constructed
from all UKIS and comparable SIPU firms.
To test Hypothesis 2, we estimate a broadly similar
model in which the dependent variable is defined to
represent the propensity to patent (independent of any
portfolio effect). Let PROPPATi represent firms’ pro-
pensity to patent:
PROPPATi ¼ β0 þ β1SIZE1 þ β2xi þ εi ð2Þ
We estimate two versions of this model to examine
the relationship between propensity to patent and firm
size. First, we use a binary dependent variable indicating
whether firms patented their single most valuable inno-
vation using innovation level controls (e.g., whether the
innovation was product or process, new to market and
financed externally). Second, we use a dependent vari-
able measuring the proportion of firms’ innovation port-
folio which is protected by patents. In each case, coef-
ficient β1 will capture the relationship between firm size
and the propensity to patent.
Our third set of regressions aims to explain the bar-
riers to patent usage in the following way:
BARRIERki ¼ b0 þ b1SIZEi þ δxi þ εi ð3Þ
where BARRIER stands for a set of k dummy variables
(0/1) that denote the different types of barriers that firms
have indicated as relevant for the decision not to patent
their most valuable innovation. Models also include
industry dummies (see Annex 3).
A range of different reasons for not patenting the
most valuable innovation were specified in SIPU, and
firms were allowed to tick more than one reason.7 In
order to obtain a more parsimonious specification, we
grouped the reasons for not patenting into three
categories:
– Non-patentable innovation: which includes the fol-
lowing motivations: (a) innovation was not eligible
for patenting, (b) patenting was not considered im-
portant by the firm, (c) innovation was not new to
the market.
– Non-enforceable patent:which includes (a) the pat-
ent would have been difficult to enforce, (b) in-
fringement of the patent would have been hard to
5 The two sets of figures are not strictly comparable as the data from
UKIS relates to innovations introduced in the 3-year period from 2012
to 2014; however, 29% of the firms in SIPU (79 of 277 firms) reported
that their most valuable innovation occurred before 2012.
6 The UK Innovation Survey (and SIPU) data sets provide a range of
useful controls but have no indicators of ownership or firm age. Both
may be important in shaping innovation outputs. Note however that the
UK Innovation Survey is restricted to firms with 10 or more employees
and so excludes smaller (and potentially young) start-up firms.
7 The reasons for not patenting that respondents could choose included
their innovation was not new to the market; the innovation was not
eligible for patent protection; the cost of patent application was too
high; a patent would have disclosed too much; infringement of the
patent would be difficult to detect; and the patent would have been
difficult to enforce. In addition, there was a free form field where firms
could enter other reasons not included on the list. We parsed the
reasons given into existing categories and added a new category that
patenting was not considered relevant.
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detect, and (c) patent would have disclosed too
much
– High cost of patenting: for firms that reported that
the cost of patent was too high.
Out of a total number of 206 firms that did not patent
their most valuable innovation, 198 (82%) indicated one
of the three motivations above as a reason for their
decision.8 Figure 1 shows that the most common reason
for not patenting is that the innovation is not patentable
(approximately 73%; for 58% this was the only reason),
followed by problems related to the fact that the patent
was not enforceable or disclosed too much information
(33%). Cost-related reasons are instead a relatively low-
er concern for SIPU firms, with only 13% of firms
indicating among the possible reasons and only 3% of
the firms indicating it as the only reason.9 For each of
the three barriers, we estimate a specific regression
model (2) where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if
that specific barrier was picked by the firm.
By looking at all three sets of regressions, we get a
more holistic picture of the barriers to the use of formal
IP. This marks a departure from past studies which have
tended to infer the barriers to patent use from the first set
of regressions alone (on patent propensity). We use the
regression analysis mainly to produce conditional
means that control for a wide range of characteristics/
attributes of the firm and the innovation. Annex 2 details
the main variables we used in the analysis for each set of
regressions, as well as the data source from which they
are drawn.
4 Results
4.1 Patent propensity at firm and innovation level
Comparing the use of patents for all innovations by
firms in UKIS 2015 and the probability of patenting
their most valuable innovation from SIPU suggests
some significant differences (Table 4). The existing
evidence, suggesting that on average small firms have
a lower patent propensity with respect to medium and
large firms, is indeed confirmed by the statistics from
UKIS firms. Table 4, column (2) shows that the share of
small-firm innovators who applied for at least one patent
in the UKIS is less than 20%, significantly different in
statistical terms from the share of innovators who patent
among medium firms (26.5%) and large firms (33%).
These differences reflect both the propensity to patent
individual innovations and the breadth of firms’ portfo-
lio of innovations.When, however, we focus only on the
most significant innovation, removing any portfolio ef-
fect (Table 5a, column 4), we find that there are no large
differences among firms of different size, i.e., among the
SIPU innovators, we find no evidence of size effects in
the propensity to patent their most valuable invention. A
first explanation of these results could be that, consider-
ing that patenting is a costly strategic decision taken by
firms, financially constrained small firms will only ap-
ply for a patent when the value of their innovation is
sufficiently high to motivate their investment.
The lack of any difference in patenting propensity
between larger and smaller firms is not, however, com-
bined to their most valuable innovation. An alternative
approach to looking at patenting propensity separate
from the portfolio effect is to examine the proportion
of all innovations protected by patents. Again, this pro-
vides a way of de-scaling the data and adjusting for the
fact that due to resource limitations, small firms may
produce fewer innovations than large firms (Table 5). As
noted earlier, Table 5 shows that a larger proportion of
small firms do not use patents to protect their innova-
tions. However, the proportion of small firms that de-
pend on patents to protect more than 50% of their
innovations does not seem significantly different to the
average or to that in medium and large firms.
8 The remaining 8 firms either reported that the innovation was still not
fully developed (and the patent application procedure had not been
started yet), or did not report a specific reason.
9 The graph also shows that a non-negligible number of firms (20%)
indicated a combination of the three (or two) reasons rather than a
single one, suggesting that in some cases, different factors matter at the
same time.
Table 3 Use of patents in CIS and SIPU
Used patents at all (UKIS) Patented the most
valuable innovation
(SIPU)
No Yes All firms
No 144 7 151
Yes 29 64 93
All firms 173 71 244
Sources: Authors’ computations on SIPU 2015merged with UKIS
2015
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To examine these differences in a multivariate con-
text, controlling for factors such as the industry affilia-
tion of the firm, R&D activities, access to external
finance, and type of innovation introduced, we use
regression and probit analysis (Table 6). Both the SIPU
and UKIS survey datasets are cross sectional, so here we
Table 4 Percentage of innovators applying for patents in the UKIS 2015 and in SIPU for their most valuable innovation
Patents all CIS innovators Patents SIPU
(1) (2)
Num. % Num. %
Total innovating firms 2641 277
Total patenting firms 666 25.22 71 25.63
Small firms (< 49 employees) 197 19.58*** 35 24.8
Medium firms (50–249 employees) 285 26.46*** 25 27.2
Large Firms (> 250 employees) 184 32.97*** 11 25
Product innovation 546 35.23*** 57 33.1**
Process innovation 381 21.04 10 18.9
New to market 397 43.77*** 44 32.5**
New to firm 328 23.4 10 14.3
Continuous R&D 451 38.06*** 49 34.75***
No R&D or discontinuous R&D 215 14.77 22 16.18
Independent firms – – 30 20.6
Affiliated to a group – – 41 31.3**
Internally financed – – 46 22.1
Any external finance – – 23 40.4***
Source: Computations from UKIS 2015 and SIPU 2015. **Ssignificance at 5%; ***Significance at 1%
Not patentable innovation 
High costs of 
patenting
Not Enforceable 
patent 
120 (58%)
21 (10%)
29 (14%)7 (3%)
9 (4%)
2 (1%)
10 (5%)
Fig. 1 Summary of firms’ reasons for not patenting. N = 206 (100%); in 8 cases, (4%) none of the three reasons was specified as important
(other reasons were specified as important). Source SIPU
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use regression analysis as a purely descriptive (rather
than causal) tool to assess if there are differences
between small and large firms in their probability of
patenting. Table 6, model 1 reports the conditional
Table 5 Percentage of innovations protected by patents in UKIS 2015 for different groups of firms—percent of firms and number of firms in
parentheses
Percentage of innovations protected
None < 10% 10 to 40% 41 to 60% 61 to 90% > 90%
All innovating firms 75.50 (2009) 9.39 (250) 4.81 (128) 2.71 (72) 2.48 (66) 5.11 (136)
Small firms 81.51 (829) 5.31 (54) 2.56 (26) 2.16 (22) 2.75 (28) 5.70 (58)
Medium firms 74.05 (802) 10.71 (116) 5.91 (64) 2.77 (30) 2.22 (24) 4.34 (47)
Large firms 67.38 (378) 14.26 (80) 6.77 (38) 3.57 (20) 2.50 (14) 5.53 (31)
Product innovator 65.71 (1025) 13.21 (206) 6.86 (107) 3.78 (59) 3.40 (53) 7.05 (110)
Process innovators 79.68 (1455) 7.78 (142) 4.05 (74) 2.46 (45) 2.19 (40) 3.83 (70)
New to market 57.53 (527) 14.30 (131) 8.95 (82) 5.02 (46) 4.59 (42) 9.61 (88)
New to firm 77.28 (1092) 10.26 (145) 4.60 (65) 2.48 (35) 1.98 (28) 3.40 (48)
Continuous R&D 62.62 (747) 13.50 (161) 8.47 (101) 3.94 (47) 4.11 (49) 7.38 (88)
No R&D or discontinuous R&D 79.65 (454) 8.42 (48) 3.33 (19) 2.63 (15) 1.93 (11) 4.04 (23)
Source: Authors’ computations from UKIS 2015
Table 6 Patent propensity among innovating firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent
variables
Probability of patenting
any innovation
Probability of patenting
any innovation
Probability of patenting most
valued innovation
Share of
innovations
patented
Share of
innovations
patented
Sample UKIS SIPU SIPU UKIS SIPU
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS
Continuous R&D 0.135*** 0.182*** 0.110** 0.054*** 0.071*
(0.019) (0.069) (0.045) (0.011) (0.036)
Small firm (< 49
employees)
− 0.126*** −0.274*** − 0.04 − 0.016 0.000
(0.021) (0.093) (0.066) (0.013) (0.048)
Medium firm
(50–249 emps)
− 0.067*** − 0.268*** −0.037 − 0.022* − 0.027
(0.021) (0.082) (0.064) (0.013) (0.045)
Innovation
externally
financed
0.222***
(0.076)
Product innovator 0.130*** 0.287*** − 0.07 0.024* 0.126***
(0.022) (0.071) (0.043) (0.012) (0.043)
Process innovator − 0.042* 0.181*** − 0.122*** − 0.027* 0.130***
(0.022) (0.068) (0.044) (0.014) (0.048)
New to market
Innovator
0.177*** 0.232*** 0.047 0.094*** 0.133***
(0.020) (0.066) (0.043) (0.012) (0.037)
Observations 2618 268 277 2641 291
Pseudo R2/R2 0.154 0.236 0.185 0.088 0.19
Log likelihood − 1483 − 176.5 − 157.7 − 50.37 − 53.39
Models include a set of industry dummies—not reported (see Annex 2)
Notes: * for significance at 10%; ** for significance at 5%; *** for significance at 1%
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probability of a firm obtaining a patent in the UKIS
sample of innovators, around 2600 firms. The reference
group in the model is larger firms, and we find the
familiar result that small and medium firms are less
likely to patent. Small firms are 12.6% less likely to be
patenting than large firms, a gap which falls to 6.7% for
medium firms (Table 6, model 1). We see a similar result
for the smaller group of firms which are included in the
SIPU dataset (Table 6, model 2). Here again small and
medium firms are significantly less likely to be
patenting than larger firms. These differences in the
probability of patenting at firm-level reflect the combi-
nation of the portfolio and propensity to patent effect,
and provide strong confirmation of Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 reflects the propensity to patent firms’
innovations excluding any portfolio effect. We test this
proposition in two ways. First, by focusing on whether
there is any difference in large firms’ and small firms’
propensity to patent their most valuable innovation and,
secondly, by exploring whether there is any difference in
the proportion of firms’ portfolio of innovations is pat-
ented. Table 6, model 3 focuses on the propensity to
patent firms’ most valuable innovation which we are
only able to estimate for the smaller SIPU sample.10 In
line with the descriptive results in Table 5, we find here
that being a small firm (less than 50 employees) does not
significantly decrease the propensity to patent the firms’
most valuable innovation. Note, however, that both for
small and medium firms, coefficients are negative but
insignificant. The implication is that there is no signifi-
cant difference in the probability that smaller firms and
large firms will patent their most valuable innovation,
and that it is therefore the portfolio effect rather than the
propensity to innovate effect which explains the differ-
ence between the probability of small and large firm
patenting.
A second test of Hypothesis 2 is provided by the
models in Table 6 columns 4 and 5.11 Here, we directly
de-scale the patenting data by looking at the proportion
of firms’ innovations protected by patents. Again, this
focuses attention on the propensity to patent and
removes any portfolio effect. Here again, in both the
(larger) UKIS and (smaller) SIPU samples, we find no
significant difference in the proportion of small and
larger firms’ innovations which are protected by
patenting (Table 6, models 4 and 5). The very similar
results here obtained for both the larger UKIS and
smaller SIPU samples also suggest that this result is
not simply a consequence of differences in sample size
in the SIPU and UKIS surveys. Instead, our result of the
insignificance of the difference in the proportion of
patented innovations in larger and small firms proves
robust in both samples. Taken together, our analysis
therefore provides strong support for Hypothesis 2 and
the idea that small and large firms have similar patent
propensity.
4.2 Barriers to patenting
We turn now to the discussion of why firms may not
patent their valuable innovation. Using data from the
smaller SIPU sample, we consider the responses of all
firms that reported a valuable innovation, but did not
patent that innovation (Table 7). The three most impor-
tant reasons for not patenting were the innovation could
not be patented (68%), followed by the patent would
have been difficult to enforce (31%), and lack of novelty
(30%). Interestingly, these three reasons continue to be
the main reasons for not patenting even when we look
across the different groups of firms.12 The fear that
patents would disclose too much was the least frequent-
ly reported reason for not patenting (4%).
The next three columns in Table 7 look at the reasons
for not patenting by firm size. Statistically significant
differences are highlighted in italic. In general, the rea-
sons for not patenting the most valuable innovationwere
similar between medium and large firms. Medium and
large firms were more likely not to patent because their
innovations could not be protected by patents, especially
when compared to small firms. Large firms often have
in-house legal advisors and this may make them more
aware of the patentability of innovations. One in five
10 Among the other control variables, we also include some new
variables not included in Table 5 but which have been suggested by
the literature on patenting. Additionally, we check for the effect of
openness, i.e., the fact that a firm develops its most important innova-
tion collaboratively with other external partners, and we find that it
exerts a negative effect on patenting.
11 Table 6 reports OLS estimates but we found qualitatively similar
results using fractional logit models (not reported here). These results
are available from the authors upon request.
12 Our summary category of non-patentable innovation includes three
sub-categories identified in the SIPU survey: (a) innovation was not
eligible for patenting, (b) patenting was not considered important by
the firm, and (c) innovation was not new to the market. It is notable that
(b) was ranked as relevant only by 8.2% of the population of firms and
small firms were not significantly different from the average. Patent-
ability is a significant reason for not patenting but this is not a reason
reported disproportionately often by small firms.
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Table 7 Reasons for not patenting given by innovating firms (% of firms choosing each reason)
Reasons for not patenting Non-
patenting
firms
(n = 206)
Small
firms
Medium
Firms
Large
firms
Product
innovators
Process
innovators
Not
continuous
R&D
Continuous
R&D
Not
Open
Open
The innovation was not
eligible for patent protection
140 67.9 62.3 76.1 69.7 62.6 72.1 75.4 58.7 75.7 63.6
The patent would have been
difficult to enforce
64 31.1 34.9 26.8 27.2 33.0 39.5 25.4 38.1 28.3 32.5
Innovation was not new to the
market
62 30 33.0 28.4 24.2 23.5 41.9 37.7 20.7 31.1 29.5
The cost of patent application
was too high
28 13.5 20.8 7.5 3.0 18.3 11.6 7.9 20.7 13.5 13.6
Infringement of the patent
would be difficult to detect
21 10.2 11.3 9.0 9.1 12.2 9.3 9.6 10.9 12.2 9.1
Patent was not relevant 17 8.2 8.5 10.4 3.0 9.6 0.0 12.3 3.3 4.1 10.6
A patent would have disclosed
too much
8 3.8 6.6 1.5 0.0 4.3 4.7 2.6 5.4 2.7 4.5
Other 4 1.9 0.9 3.0 3.3 2.6 0.0 0.8 3.3 1.4 2.3
Values in italic identify statistically significant differences. Source: Computations from SIPU2015
Table 8 Probit models of reasons for not patenting
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variables Not patentable Not enforceable High costs
Sample SIPU SIPU SIPU
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit
Value of invention − 0.021 0.057*** 0
(0.021) (0.021) (0.000)
Continuous R&D − 0.132* 0.049 0
(0.072) (0.077) (0.000)
Small firm (< 49 employees) 0.055 − 0.019 0.183***
(0.110) (0.121) (0.068)
Medium firm (50–249 emps) 0.156 − 0.068 0.477***
(0.097) (0.117) (0.097)
Any external finance − 0.03 − 0.091 0
(0.091) (0.080) (0.000)
Process innovation 0.003 − 0.034 0
(0.085) (0.091) (0.000)
Business strategy 0.142** − 0.140* − 0.004
(0.070) (0.085) (0.003)
New to the market innovation − 0.142** 0.190*** 0
(0.065) (0.073) (0.000)
Openness (dummy) − 0.041 − 0.013 0
(0.063) (0.075) (0.000)
Observations 197 197 197
Pseudo R2/R2 0.225 0.149 0.373
Log likelihood − 88.07 − 103 − 49.39
Models include a set of industry dummies—not reported (see Annex 2)
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small firms (20%) reported not patenting because they
found the cost of patenting to be too high (as compared
to 7% of medium and 3% of large firms). This latter
finding is consistent with the literature on small firms
reviewed in Hughes and Mina (2010) which identifies
the cost of patenting to be the single largest obstacle to
the use of patents by small firms.
In order to understand which factors are associated
with each of the motivations for not patenting, we
restrict our analysis to firms from the SIPU survey
who innovated but did not apply for a patent for their
most valuable innovation (Table 8). We run three sepa-
rate probit models, as outlined in Eq. (2): for each of
them, we use as dependent variable whether the inno-
vation was “not,” “not enforcable,” or “high costs.”13
The independent variables consist of all the other char-
acteristics of the firm and innovation that we have
introduced in the previous sections as likely to influence
each of the motivations. In particular, these include the
size of each firm, whether the firm performs R&D
activities, the general propensity of a firm to patent its
innovations, the specific value of the innovation, the
type of innovation introduced (whether a product or
process innovation, or a new business strategy), the
novelty of the innovation (new to the market or new
only for the firm), the specific source of financing for the
innovation ,and whether a collaboration put in place to
develop the valuable innovation.14
Our estimation suggests no significant difference in
the patentability of small and larger firms most valuable
innovation (Table 8, model 1). Innovation quality—at
least in terms of firms’ most valuable innovation—
appears not to be a significantly greater barrier to
patenting in smaller firms. Similarly, the enforceability
of patents is not seen as a stronger barrier to patenting in
smaller firms (Table 8, model 2). As suggested by
Table 7, however, high costs of patenting were more
commonly cited as a barrier to patenting their most
valuable innovation by smaller and medium-sized firms
(Table 8, model 3). Interestingly, this effect remained
unchanged whether or not firms were using external
finance to fund their innovation activity. Our results
provide support for Hypothesis 3: smaller firms do have
a stronger perception of cost barriers to using patents as
a means of protecting their most valuable innovations.
5 Conclusions
It is a widely held view that small firms patent less than
large firms (Hall et al., 2013; Pajak, 2016). In this paper,
we analyze whether this is simply because small firms
have fewer innovations or because they are less likely to
patent any specific innovation (due to lower patent
propensity) or because the costs of owning and
enforcing patents are too high. Using novel data which
combine innovation and firm level information, our
paper tries to disentangle these three sources of differ-
ence which could result in the observed lower patenting
behavior of small firms.
Our empirical results suggest three key findings.
First, confirming evidence from other studies, we too
find that smaller firms are less likely to be patenting than
larger firms. However, using data on individual innova-
tions, our analysis also suggests that smaller firms are no
less likely than large firms to patent any specific inno-
vation or proportion of their innovations. In other words,
the propensity to patent any specific innovation is
broadly similar in firms of all sizes. The implication is
that differences in the probability that smaller and larger
firms will patent relate not to a “propensity to patent”
effect but primarily to the ‘”effect.” i.e., larger firms
create a greater number of innovations than smaller
firms and therefore are simply more likely to create
one or more which are patentable. This is consistent
with studies of innovation survey data which consistent-
ly suggest a positive relationship between firm size and
the likelihood, volume, and novelty of innovation. Our
third finding is that where firms do not patent specific
innovations, it is cost barriers rather than issues related
13 Since we show that some of the reasons were jointly considered as
important by some firms, we also checked whether the use of a
trivariate probit model, which allows for the correlation between the
error terms of each model, was more appropriate. The results showed
that indeed there is some correlation between the error terms of the
three models, in particular there is a positive and significant correlation
between the error term of the non-enforceable patent model and the
high cost of patenting specification. However, the signs and signifi-
cance of the trivariate probit model are perfectly in line with those
obtained running three separate probit analyses. Since in the case of the
trivariate probit, it is not straight forward to calculate marginal effects
for each of the independent variables, we eventually decided to report
marginal effects from the separate probit models, which are much
easier to interpret.
14 In the regressions, we only use 190 observations instead of 206,
because some firms did not answer to some of the questions in the
survey that we use to build our independent variables (7 firms did not
answer to the question related to financing sources, while other 9 did
not indicate the specific type of innovation). For this reason, 16
observations could not be used in the empirical analyses.
Small firms and patenting revisited
to the awareness of patenting or innovation quality
which are driving any firm size differences.
Our results paint a picture where small firms which
have patentable innovations of actual or potential com-
mercial value are equally likely to patent these as larger
firms. Policy concerns about lower patenting rates
among smaller firms may therefore be misplaced being
instead a natural consequence of firm size differences
and the fact that large firms typically have a larger
number of patentable innovations. Issues do remain,
however, about small firms engagement with patenting
particularly as small firms are more likely to cite cost
barriers to patenting than larger firms (Table 8), and any
cost reductions may therefore have a disproportionate
effect on smaller firms. Yet, although the costs of
patenting are well known and understood (WIPO,
undated), this is an area where policy measures are
limited. For example, in the UK,. patenting and trade
mark costs are explicitly excluded from the eligible
expenses which are covered by R&D tax credits for all
sizes of firms although these costs may be offset using
other tax breaks.15 Most policy initiatives targeted at
small firms have instead concentrated on creating
awareness and educating small firms about the value
of patenting. Helping smaller firms to offset the costs of
obtaining patents by extending the eligible expenses for
R&D tax credits would increase patent use by smaller
firms. Alongside this, it has been suggested that small
firms may be helped by establishing patent litigation
insurance schemes which could help with the costs of
defending patents (CJA Consultants Ltd, 2006) with
some countries (China, Japan) offering subsidies to
small firms to join private IP insurance schemes
(EUIPO, 2018, p. 6).
At a more general level, our results suggest the value
of combining firm-level and innovation-level data.
Innovation-level data can provide more detailed insights
into firms’ decision rules as they applied to a specific
project, effects which are obscured where firms are
making decisions about a portfolio of innovations. Our
study suffers from a number of limitations. First, our
data is restricted to the UK, and international replication
would therefore be desirable. Second, we focus here on
patenting in isolation, and it would also be valuable to
explore potential complementary or substitute
relationships between forms of IP protection. This may
be particularly important for smaller firms where patent
costs may encourage the adoption of less costly IP
protection mechanisms. Third, our estimation sample
drawn from the SIPU data is relatively small reducing
the potential for sub-sample analysis. Larger samples
would enable us to explore whether the general patterns
we see in terms of portfolio and propensity effects prove
generally robust. For example, it may be useful to con-
sider separately the patenting behaviors of high growth
firms and those in the more general SME population.
Finally, future analyses could also use panel data to add
robustness to our exploratory analysis: this may de-
crease the potential endogeneity problems that could
affect our cross-sectional estimates. Such analyses could
also explore interactions between patenting propensity
and portfolio size which may arise as both may depend
to some extent on the cost-benefit of patenting.
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Annex
Annex 1. A formalization of the hypotheses
The paper contains three hypotheses that could belong
into a single optimization problem written formally as
follows:
Max V P;N ; pð Þ ¼ P π0pþ π 1−pð Þ
 
þ N−Pð Þπ−Γ Pð Þ ð4Þ
where V is the expected profit of innovation to the firm
(maximized over P),N is the number of innovations the
firm is able to create by virtue of its size (large/small).
We assume N is increasing in firm size so that N and
firm size are synonymous.
P is the number of patents the firm decides to apply
for. P/N ≤ 1, firms can at most patent all their innova-
tions but usually only a fraction is patented because of
the conditions surrounding the grant of a patent (viz.,
novelty and codifiability of technical knowledge).
p is the probability that a submitted patent is granted,
assumed to be exogenous and common to both large and
15 See https://www.gov.uk/guidance/corporation-tax-research-and-
deve lopmen t - t ax - r e l i e f - fo r - sma l l - and-med ium-s i z ed -
enterprises#costs-you-can-claim.
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small firms, although this assumptionmay be relaxed. In
fact, p may be a function of the maturity of the
technology/ sector. More mature technologies may find
it hard to find a truly novel innovation that can earn a
patent, conversely new technologies may offer a lot of
opportunity for patenting. The quality of a firm’s R&D
projects may also influence p and the received wisdom
is that (unobservable) R&D management capabilities
drive better project choice. Hence, in the way we esti-
mate our model, we include both industrial sector
dummies and whether a firm is a continuous R&D
performer as controls for the potential influences on p.
Profits from an innovation that has patent protection
(π’) can be assumed to exceed those from an innovation
that is not protected (π), so (π’ − π) > 0.
Γ is the fixed cost of patenting, which increases in the
number of patent applications (P) but has a fixed com-
ponentC that is incurred irrespective of whether the firm
files one or many patents. This could be the costs of
setting up an in-house IP department for a large firm or
engaging a patent attorney over the length of a patent
life to show a credible commitment to enforcing the
patent, should it be infringed.
The first order condition for this problem is:
∂V=∂P ¼ π’−πð Þ p−∂Γ Pð Þ=∂P ð5Þ
This provides an interior solution for P, which de-
scribes an interior maximum if the second-order condi-
tion is negative. In other words, it must be true that the
fixed costs of patenting are increasing at an increasing
rate in P for each firm.
We assume that Γ(P) =C + Pb with b ≥ 2.
Then the first-order condition implies that the equi-
librium number of patents P* is:
P* ¼ 1
b
π’−πð Þ p
 1=b−1
ð6Þ
Notice that this equation does not involve N (equiv-
alently is independent of firm size in this simple formu-
lation) and forms the basis for Hypothesis 2.
However, the fixed cost element in the cost function
means that depending upon the size of the fixed cost,
there will be a minimum threshold of patentable inno-
vations that are needed before a firm applies for a patent.
C ≤ (π’)P*. This reasoning forms the basis for Hypoth-
esis 3.
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Table 9 Variable definitions and sources
Variable Source of data Description of the variable
Dependent variable
(Table 6)
Patent application UKIS 2015 and SIPU 2015 Dummy variable = 1 when respondent reports applying for a patent to
protect any innovation
Patent application SIPU 2015 Dummy variable = 1 when respondent reports applying for a patent
to protect their most valuable innovation
Patent coverage UKIS 2015 and SIPU 2015 Share of firms’ innovations protected by patents (%)
Dependent variables
(Table 8)
Non-patentable innovation SIPU 2015 Dummy variable = 1, if firm said any of the following reasons prevented
them from applying for a patent— (a) innovation was not eligible for
patenting, (b) patenting was not considered important by the firm, and
(c) innovation was not new to the market.
Non-enforceable patent SIPU 2015 Dummy variable = 1, if firm said any of the following reasons prevented
them from applying for a patent— (a) the patent would have been difficult
to enforce, (b) infringement of the patent would have been hard to detect
and (c) and patent would have disclosed too much
High cost of patenting SIPU 2015
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Table 9 (continued)
Variable Source of data Description of the variable
Dummy variable = 1, if firm said high costs prevented them from
applying for a patent
Firm-specific variables
Small firm UKIS 2015 Dummy variable = 1, if the firm employed less than 50 persons
Medium firm UKIS 2015 Dummy variable = 1, if the firm employed between 50
and 249 employees
Large firm UKIS 2015 Dummy variable = 1, if the firm employed more than 250 employees
Continuous R&D UKIS 2015 Dummy variable that takes value 1 if firms had undertaken internal
R&D in 2012, 2013, and 2014
Overall patent propensity UKIS 2015 The proportion of innovations between 2012 and 2014 that was
protected by patents
Overall trademark propensity UKIS 2015 The proportion of innovations between 2012 and 2014 that was
protected by trademarks
17 Industrial sectors UKIS 2015 Based on the 2-digit SIC and aggregated to get a minimum of 20
observations per group. See Table 1 for details
Innovation-specific variables (for the commercially most valuable innovation)
Openness SIPU 2015 Dummy variable = 1 when respondent reports’ collaborative
partner was involved in producing its most valuable innovation
Suppliers SIPU 2015 Dummy variable = 1 when respondent reports’ collaboration with
supplier was involved in producing its most valuable innovation
Clients SIPU 2015 Dummy variable = 1 when respondent reports’ collaboration with
client was involved in producing its most valuable innovation
Other types of collaboration SIPU 2015 Dummy variable= 1 when respondent reports’ collaboration with
public sector labs, consultants, competitors, or HEI was involved
in producing its most valuable innovation
Value of innovation SIPU 2015 Value of turnover (%) in 2014 accounted for by the most valuable innovation
Product innovation SIPU 2015 Dummy variable= 1, if the most valuable innovationwas a product innovation
Process innovation SIPU 2015 Dummy variable = 1, if the most valuable innovation was a process
innovation
Business strategy innovation SIPU 2015 Dummy variable = 1, if the most valuable innovation was a wider innovation
New to the market
innovation
SIPU 2015 Dummy variable= 1, if the most valuable innovation was a new to the market
New to the firm innovation SIPU 2015 Dummy variable = 1, if the most valuable innovation was new to the firm
Any external finance SIPU 2015 Dummy variable = 1, if the firm used any external finance to finance
its most valuable innovation
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the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and
indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party
material in this article are included in the article's Creative Com-
mons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the
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